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Interaction is between; correspondence in-between
-T. Ingold

Abstract
In this paper I present a philosophical approach stemming from the general framework
of ecological aesthetics, speci cally de ned here as a perceptual attitude that entails
intimacy, engagement, participation, and care. In order to develop this approach, I lean
on some authors that I nd sympathetic to my view; particularly important are John
Dewey, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Arnold Berleant and Tim Ingold. Following Ingold, I
propose a revaluation of what he calls “feet” to highlight the active and mobile nature
of perception and a consideration for an ontology of living beings as a uid meshwork
composed by lines. I then propose to call ‘haptic perception’ an inter- and transsensorial perceptual approach, according to which the world we constantly move along
is objectless, a meshwork continuously made of uid interwoven lines. To understand
this, we need to nurture an aesthetic approach free from the logic of the paradigm
consisting of subject/object and of a sheer distinction between ontology and
epistemology in favor of a radical relationalism.
Key Words
Arnold Berleant; John Dewey; ecological aesthetics; haptic perception; Tim Ingold;
meshwork; Maurice Merleau-Ponty; relationalism
1. Introduction: in praise of a radical relationalism
Recent aesthetics has dealt with ecology and environment in di erent ways, and there
have been various attempts for an “aesthetics of the environment” and for “ecological
aesthetics.”[1] In this paper I propose a di erent approach to this issue stemming from
the idea that, in general, aesthetics, as a philosophy of perception and of experience,
should be always ecological.[2] By that, I take a more radical position aimed at showing
that aesthetics should be not so much a philosophy of perception and of experience
but a philosophy with experience. However, as it is not a very popular position, before
putting all my cards on the table I need to clarify some preliminary points and to
situate my proposal within a speci c scenario.
I use the term ‘ecology’ stemming from James J. Gibson, as in the expression “ecology
of perception,” that is, the continuous perceptual relationship and attunement with the
environment. Ecology, in other words, is the way in which we inhabit and cope with the
environment but, as I will show in the text, environment not as a container or a space
we occupy but rather as the world we inhabit as we make it. By ecological aesthetics,
then, I intend an aesthetics that goes beyond the sharp distinction between subject
and object in favor of a radically relational model of knowledge. In order to make
ecological perception e ective, we need to overcome the subject/object paradigm of
knowledge that is aligned with the traditional model of modern Western aesthetics.
The ecological and relational aesthetics thus supports the idea that knowledge is not
transmitted but is made as an ongoing process that involves perceivers and the
perceived. In this framework, as discussed below, perception is action, and making
knowledge means participating with an active and always emerging movement that
involves what we normally think of as di erent entities or beings.[3] The radical
relationalism at stake here implies that beings are not xed individuals, as they are not
in relation; rather they are relations.
Ecological aesthetics supports, then, the reshaping of the notions of subjectivity and
identity according to a non-individualistic approach. Participation and implication are
conditions of perception and knowledge; this can bring us to the idea of knowledge
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through movement instead of through cogitation that I will develop later. One
consequence of this is that ecological aesthetics goes beyond the strict distinction
between knowledge and being. According to the proposed framework, in fact, as
knowledge is not knowing about things but with them, epistemology and ontology
cannot be radically separated. This is a paramount point for my proposal, because it
disrupts the main paradigm of disinterestedness for “true” appreciation and
enjoyment. As we know, disinterestedness is one of the keystones of modern Western
aesthetics, in particular the Kantian; following a di erent line, the Deweyan one, I
believe that an alternative is possible.[4] Disinterestedness usually goes in parallel with
distance, considered the necessary ingredient for critical observation, judgment, and
pure aesthetic appreciation. However, I believe that critical observation, and
contemplation, do not need distance. On the contrary, as I will show, they always entail
participation and implication. What makes the di erence is (just) the explicit awareness
of it: where an attuned perception is aware of its ecological texture and can explicitly
practice a shift from critical distance to critical intimacy, an unaware one cannot.[5]
Stemming from this awareness, ecological aesthetics, as it is not object-oriented but
process-oriented, does not practice as much the judgment of objects but instead takes
care in savoring processes and experiencing.[6]
Ecological perception, furthermore, does not straightforwardly separate thought from
feeling; rather, a thinking/feeling always emerges, and this is what we call perception.
As it is ecological, that is, immersed in an experience and situated in space and time,
perception is always local and not universal, and site-speci c and not general.
According to this paradigm, this is also true, of course, for aesthetic perception, as it
concerns experiences of a particular kind. Finally, ecological aesthetics is an everyday
aesthetics and it promotes an art of everyday life that corresponds to a perceptual
engagement that I propose to call perceptual wisdom. The notion of wisdom moves
toward the attitude of being attuned with the world and expresses the willingness to
practice an empathetic participation with others based on care and attention. Thus
ecological aesthetics, is not an aesthetics of choice and intention but of care and
attention. I propose to name this perceptual way to deal with the world ‘haptic
perception,’ in opposition to the optical and retinoic framework on which the main
currents of traditional modern and Western aesthetics, based on distance and
dominance of visual perception, are founded. The haptic does not only refer to the
sense of touch; it is inter- and trans-sensorial, and the opposite is true for the optic.
These two adjectives, then, indicate a way to perceive, a potential for all the senses and
their unity to feel/think with the world.
As it is already clear from my introduction, among other prominent sources of
reference and inspiration, like John Dewey and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, my position is
close and sympathetic to Arnold Berleant’s thinking and his idea of aesthetics as a
practice of constant engagement.[7] In this text, I also turn to Tim Ingold’s work, which I
nd useful for helping me to nd new terminology for an attempt to write with
ecological aesthetics and not (only) about ecological aesthetics. It is a “knowing from
inside” approach, always unattainable in its pure expression, of course, because we
need to conceptualize, but somehow showable through examples, stories, and ways to
arrange the set of argumentations.
To achieve this goal, I will follow an unconventional route: I will walk along my path
with terms such as feet, lines, weather, and labyrinth. They are not usual in the
aesthetic debate but, I believe, they can contribute to a broadening of perspective.[8] I
hope that these terms help to create an appealing scenario for an ecological aesthetics,
that is, an aesthetics of corresponding with beings and things. The term
‘correspondence’ is paramount; by this, I do not mean the adaequatio rei et intellectus,
or the correspondence of form with matter. On the contrary, following Ingold, I mean it
in the sense of postal correspondence, as in an exchange of letters. To cor-respond
means to respond with: questions and answers, actions and passions; a way of living
attentively and perceiving what we encounter along the paths of life.
2. Feet and lines: how to live with the world-environment
James Gibson has pointed out the deep ecological dimension of perception. As we are
always immersed in an environment, perception emerges and develops in and through
it. We just need to be aware of it and draw the consequences. However, how do we
achieve this awareness? Is a theory of perception su cient? I want to address an issue
about the idea of interaction. What is at stake in the supposed interaction between
perception and environment? In many theorists of ecological aesthetics, the
environment is still something severed and, in principle, di erent from the beings that
inhabit and perceive it. It is a kind of container. The concept of a ordance proposed by
Gibson is a very useful trigger for thinking about the relationship between perceptual
organisms and the environment as a ordances open up a world of unfolding
possibilities, information and invitations that continuously build upon one another.
Nevertheless, even for Gibson the idea of environment remains somehow rigid,
cluttered with objects of all sorts, a space occupied.[9] I think this is because of the idea
of interaction, in which the perceivers and the perceived environment are, in principle,
still clearly distinguishable, although inextricably related. According to this model, then,
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relation is inter-action, presupposing that discrete, individual entities exist before and
are independent of their relationship. Berleant highlights this di culty, suggesting that
we should move from a consistent ecological thought, and I agree with the point. We
need to move away from “one of the last survivors of the mind-body dualism,” in favor
of a radical approach to ecological knowledge according to which we are not in, rather
with the world.[10]
Let us take a closer look at the walls and the roof of the building I need to establish
here. If knowledge is relational and participatory, hence ecological, then ecological
knowledge is perceptual. If perception is action, however, how we act and perceive is
then not just a matter of unavoidable necessity, it asks for an ethos, a modality of
perception stressed as aesthetic engagement by Berleant and Yuriko Saito, no doubt
following Dewey. To put it succinctly, perception, as it is relational and actively
engaged, is never pure and objective; rather, it is oriented, directional, and selective.
Once we accept it, we can simply forget the obsession with the objective knowledge
based on the presumed distance between the knower and the known and move
towards a di erent approach. Once one removes the dichotomy between the
environment and the subject, one can nurture an ecological perception as a proper
modus vivendi based on intimacy, participation, and caring. I believe we can interpret
engagement as a similar term, sharing the same scenario.
We need, then, an education of attention that leads us to a di erent quality of
perception, not detached and objects-focused but, rather, interwoven and sympathetic
with the processes.[11] If we are always immersed in the processes, and if we inhabit
the world we contribute to make through a constant ux of “making-of- experiences,” a
theory of ecology and, consequently, a theory of ecological aesthetics is then not
su cient. The change I propose is that theory cannot have the last word in aesthetics,
and the ecological aesthetics that I propose is a way to indicate it. Aesthetics as a
theory about something—whatever, the arts, the body, senses —shows its limits
because ecological perception is experiential; it needs to be practiced and lived, in the
occurrences of every experience.
How can we be engaged in an ecological perception? Through a constant exercise of
opening-up, of exposure to the currents of life. First, it is necessary to marvel at life per
se, at life that revives every time, as Merleau- Ponty noted (“La nature était au premier
jour“) and, of course, also Plato and Aristotle (“Wonder is the only beginning of
philosophy,” says Socrates). However, this exercise does not mean mere, passive
retreating into observation. On the contrary, it has to do with imagination, which stems
from the ongoing process of exchange, in Dewey’s words, of doing/undergoing, letting
emerge the perceptual texture of the past and the future, of memory and creation. To
anticipate what follows, the education to the perceptual engagement described above
is not a pedagogy. Rather, it concerns a sort of exposure to the currents of the
experience. This exposition means being open, attentive, and receptive to correspond
to the encounters that emerge along the life-process.[12] I also need to clarify one
important point. One could ask why it should be needed, this exercise of exposition, as
an ongoing process of attention to what is already there – the life-processes, the
currents of experience. The problem is that a “lazy” perception covers what is already
there, in the background of our experience, making its appearance as it were xed,
stable, and objecti ed. In order to re-activate and reawaken the uidity of the world,
we need to shift from our comfort-zone to a new perceptual attitude.
We perceive as we live. If action is perception, being alive is to act and to move, even if
one is not physically moving because perception is movement. I nd very fruitful
following the idea, from Paul Klee to Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari to Ingold, that
living beings are lines in motion along a path, locomoting perceptions, entanglements
of threads and lines, clumps of knots that continuously modify and alter one another.
As living beings, we always move along the world’s crust (“the sentient being rides the
crest of the world’s becoming”), creating it with every step. According to what I stated
earlier, we do not move in an already given environment, rather we move along it,
making and participating in its ceaseless becoming.[13] The environment as a worldenvironment, more generally as a context, is never completely stable; it is “made,”
woven, and continuously storied. Because of this entanglement there are no sentient
subjects on the one side and sensed objects on the other. The world itself feels and
perceives; we are and in every instant produce (from the Latin pro-ducere, “leading
forward”) the world that senses with us in turn. This is a good way to understand the
deep meaning of being animate and animism. In e ect, there are not subjects or
material bodies infused with an inner soul or vital essence but beings that move and
encounter, bringing each other life. Thus, life is always in the gerund as a non- nite
verb form.
This movement occurs along paths, and these paths are the lines we trace while living.
It is like the ow of a river. We tend to forget that it ows according to an intransitive
trajectory, focusing instead too much on the riverbanks (the solidi cations, the
embankments, the “produced” objects), ignoring the fact that, without the owing of
water, there would be no banks. How can we remember and feel again this ow? We
need help not from those notable parts of the body that have always played a role in
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/
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the sensitive re-evaluation of thought, like hands and the mouth; it is better to address
the attention to the disregarded ones. Feet can help us.[14] In conventional thought,
thinking with the feet, like thinking with the belly, is just an insult to someone’s
intelligence. In fact, many hierarchical oppositions of scienti c and philosophical
modernity depend on the subordination of the feet and, more generally, on the
hierarchy between the upper and lower parts of the body. In this model, intelligence
lies in the head. Contemplation and cognition need stillness and seats; hence, eyes
ready to see and read in addition to hands free and ready to write. Conversely,
locomotion has to do with walking, hence with feet. Feet neither see nor read nor
write. When human nature is discussed in relation to the achievement of an upright
posture, the focus is mostly on hands and, just barely, on feet that are e ectively not
only the support by means of which we touch the earth but also by which we move.[15]
Closed within footwear that acts to soften the impact with the soil, the earth, and its
materials, feet have progressively lost their prehensile function. Thus, reduced to a
mere means of locomotion, they disappear from the cognitive, intellectual, cultural,
and social horizon. Feet become the means of transportation from place to place,
sliding along the neutral ground thanks to footwear. The more shoes become a
necessary feature of civilization, the more we lose the perception of the friction with
the soil and the earth.[16] On the contrary, the naked and prehensile hand becomes
the closest ally of the mind for the conceptual world. The hand comprehends (“to
comprehend” comes from the Latin cum prehendere, and means, “to grasp”), the hand
manipulates, resulting in manufacture and drawing. The link between hand and brain,
connected to upright posture and to gazing at the sky and the horizon, results in the
entire hierarchy of the perceptible and the distinction between distal and proximal
senses.[17] The revaluation of feet, then, is not about proposing a philosophy of
walking so much as a strategy to restore a perceptual engagement, an attention to the
basics of the movement on the earth as a condition of life, and hence, of thought itself.
As exemplary gestures, to think, to read, and to write while walking can help to practice
an ecological aesthetics, not as abstract knowledge about the environment and the
world, but as lived experience, habitus, a way of life.
3. The meshwork: a weather-world
Moving is tracing a line along the world. As we normally move with feet, the revaluation
of pedestrian movement is a strategy for increasing the perceptive engagement
towards an ecological aesthetics based not on the paradigm of transport from one
point to another but on the one of wayfaring.[18] Lines are threads of wayfaring in
which their continuous process of tracing—not transporting—themselves corresponds
to the bundles of knots that we can call meshwork. Meshwork, another term taken
from Ingold, indicates a fabric woven by an entanglement of lines of life, lines of
growth and movement, in contrast with the traditional notion of network as a grid
made from an inter-connection of points. The world is not a network of interconnected points but a meshwork of lines entangled ab origine. The meshwork is the
world we inhabit and we live with; hence, the world is a uid entanglement. An
ecological aesthetics should assume the meshwork paradigm because it allows the
theoretical surmounting of the subject/object paradigm, then of the individual
subjectivity, and, more important, it permits to practice the weakening of its powers
through a systemic and unifying perceptual experience.[19]
Thinking of life as a meshwork means perceiving it as bundles of lines and as tracks of
knots and twists. Walking is drawing, is moving along planes that intersect one another
producing other lines, traces, threads, and further planes. This depiction of life and
beings is not metaphorical but real, and it is possible to educate our sentient being to
such a uid and ecological perception. This education is a continuous attunement to
feel/think attentively at the ever-emerging life of the interstitial spaces along the lines.
Animate life is a ow that continuously emerges, develops, and transforms itself
amongst masses, spirals, tangles, lines of crossing and owing, not on the surface of
the world but with it. This ongoing process is the world and we can correspond to it,
moving along and dancing with it.
What about ontology here? What is at stake here is a kind of uid ontology, made of
tangles and constant constitution, interstices, evolution, and decay. There are no
isolated objects or individual beings, only substances. They uctuate between the earth
and the sky through the mixture of air, intertwining, intermingling, and transforming
one another. Thus, ecological perception is objectless; there are no objects in the
environment but uid substances, always in process even when they look still and rm.
Also in visual contemplation, perception is movement. Seeing an object is seeing with
the object that is, seeing a process because we see the voluminousness and the
weightiness of it, for example.[20] Understanding this point well is crucial because it
permits us to avoid the objections of subjectivism often directed to the aesthetic
engagement and the ecological thought.[21] Once there are no objects, even the
subject fades. There are only relations, in which the frictions of the beings encountered
along the experience play, of course, a role. This friction between perceivers and
perceived opens and develops a eld of forces that correspond to each other, and
there are many di erent ways for such correspondences to occur: agreement,
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disagreement, appreciation, disgust, wonder, indi erence, complaint, pleasure, anger,
pain, enjoyment, curiosity, excitement, boredom, happiness, sadness, and so on.
In the uid world we inhabit and live along, then, the environment is not a space
occupied but a weather– world.[22] According to Ingold, the weather corresponds to
the plethora of all the di erent materials of the world, all uidi ed with the medium of
air.[23] As we are the weather-world we live with, the di erences between humans,
things, and places are not categorial di erences of essence; rather they are positional
and functional ones. Their forms are temporary crystallizations within elds of forces, a
plexus of continuous growth, development and the decay of encounters and
relationships. Fixed identities do not exist—there is no hypostasis of “other” and “I,” of
“subject” and “object.” Identities are just stories, storied, multiplies. “We”—a transient
position—”are”—a crystallization in the ux of the meshwork—immersed in the
atmospheric reality that is continuously reshaped by our movement and breath. “This”
“is” time, time as the weather: “Immersion in the weather-world is a condition for – and
not a consequence of – pure existence as temperate, and therefore sentient,
beings.”[24] The weather-world has a correlation with the correspondent picture of
humanity. As the world is weathered, humanity is not, rather becomes, in the sense
that it is not a given, a xed datum, but an endless task to constantly achieve. Ingold,
recalling themes and suggestions from Raimondo Lullo, Ortega y Gasset and HenriLouis Bergson, proposes to think of humanity in the form of a gerund: human being
means human becoming.[25]
The paradigm of subject/object matches the picture of relationship as the creation of a
network. Here, the world is a totality of discrete and separate units that can connect
one to the other but, in principle, they can remain at distance and indi erent, without
participation or engagement. On the contrary, the meshwork as intertwining of lines
expresses the paradigm for aesthetic engagement, systemic thought, intimacy, and
caring. Once ecological perception reveals a uid world without objects and xed
entities, the awareness of interdependence and interpenetration between perceivers
and perceived takes a di erent route, shifting from inter-subjectivity to in-between.
Correspondence, in the sense here proposed, is a good term for describing this shift:
while inter-subjectivity is between beings, correspondence, instead, is in-between. It is
also a matter of language, and an ecological aesthetics should take care of this, trying
to avoid as much as possible the “I” form and also the use of nouns. The in-between is
expressed using the middle voice mid-, the midstream as a “form” of becoming.
Precisely here (here that is impossible to grasp, being always already there) knowledge
occurs, moving (wayfaring) through continuous lines that perforate one another
without interruption. I know because I move, inhabiting and implicating in the process
that I contribute to produce with the beings encountered and interwoven with me.
Classi cation may be sometimes useful but it is ctitious and abstract, while reality is
never stable and always processual. The strategic gesture to express this unity of
unavoidable crystallization and action is the attempt to use verbal and adverbial forms
and to write consequently, attempting a narrative and blurred style in order to indicate
what is lost in the classi cation. To be aware of this is practicing the ecological
perception. Ecological aesthetics is the description of this awareness in terms that try
to be theoretical and performative at the same time.
4. Haptic and optic
I can now draw a distinction between two di erent perceptual approaches that
summarizes my whole proposal: the haptic perception and the optic perception. The
term ‘haptic’ has a long history but, despite being marginal and hidden at times, it has
been recently rediscovered both in its strict and its broad sense by psychologists,
designers, technicians, and philosophers.[26] In its broader sense, haptic perception
does not refer only to the sense of touch, nor does optic perception refer only to sight.
Optic versus haptic is a metaphor that indicates two di erent kinds of attitude. An
optical approach perceives objects understood as outcomes, as the crystallization of
processes in temporary islands of stasis. Conversely, the haptic approach perceives
through the objects, that is their movements and entanglements. In my view, haptic
perception shift from objects to processes, as the “objectiveness” of the object is
always in movement, full of potential, kinaesthetic, and tactile in itself.[27] This is why
‘haptic’ replaced ‘touch’ in the philosophical jargon. The tactility of the haptic is not the
grasping of the hand, and it is not just physical. Haptic feeling/thinking is the exposure
to the ow of the processes we walk along. Haptic perception becomes and develops
along the ongoing friction made by our intertwining with other lines. Lines create the
weather-world that we are, that is new entanglements between solid, material, aerial,
and bright elements. Perceiving haptically means to sense how we are with the
substances, while riding and moving along their crests. When Merleau-Ponty writes
about the painter’s sight, he refers precisely to this experience; to see the sky means to
see with the sky, to merge with its light and presence in a relationship of reciprocal
a ection. In this creative movement of emergence, “things become things,” as MerleauPonty put it, and “the world becomes world.”[28] The haptic approach engages with
materials in the process. It is a kind of longitudinal, vertical perception, moving along
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/
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the interstices of the life of things. Conversely, the optic approach engages with the
solidity of objects and their temporary immobility.
The haptic and the optic lead to two di erent kinds of perception. If the latter has to do
with a comfort zone that solidi es the processes of life into stability and boundaries,
the former feels at ease with the ux, the métissage and implication. As I clari ed
earlier, however, the optic perception covers processes that happen anyway.
Furthermore, I would not deny that, on certain occasions and for given functions, we
need solidi cation: islands of presence, positions and functions on which we anchor
uid, transient forms and identities. On the other hand, ecological aesthetics, in my
view, is not the reverse of the traditional hierarchies. Why propose a haptic approach
to life, then? The reason is strategic. In a world dominated by an obsession with stable
objects, objectivity, numbers, commodity, and measurement, it is important to develop
and nurture an alternative approach in order to reveal the impermanence of things
and to be aware of it. Even the most rm and solid things are transitory, as humans
are. They arise, develop, grow, and decay. In order to be intimate with the world,
observing it from inside, it is good to see the materials of life as processual, and a
haptic approach helps to do this. When one perceives the processes, the reality of
materials emerges (“matter” comes from the Latin word mater, the generative mother
that I have known through touching and that I touched, by blending surfaces and
substances, myself, in turn, as a blended substance), anticipating the “given” as a
product and touching the making in the process (life-in-the-making). One plunges into
the ow, perceives the processes that incessantly make objects. According to this
approach, there is no inside and outside. Lines do not have insides and outsides; they
move and get knotty.
Let me turn to some examples. I perceive a wooden chair as an object and as a
produced function when I sit on it. However, if I sand it down or saw through it, I return
to the concrete life and to the process of the material overshadowed by the objectchair. While I operate on the material, the qualities of the object-chair retreat and the
processual and knobbly substance beyond the object emerges. Also, in the eld of food
we can recognize an optic taste and a haptic taste. Let us take wine. The optical
approach to taste, based on objectifying and referential sensory analysis that builds
ontological maps (what avors, fragrances, what aromas, there would be in wine),
emerged massively in the second half of the twentieth century, aiming to consider wine
as a dissectible object (colors, odors, tastes). The haptic taste, instead, perceives the
wine as a whole, without fragmenting it in discrete pieces or blocks. Wine is neither a
commodity nor an object; it is a living substance. Thanks to this approach, the
experience of drinking becomes, in my view, and in a Deweyan stream, fully (ecological)
aesthetic. The haptic engagement suggests caressing wine and letting the wine caress
us, blending its substances with ours and recalling the materials with which it is made.
An ongoing correspondence allows a perception of wine before its solidi cation as an
object, before its analysis as a mere commodity. I drink and feel the rock, the earth, the
sky, the air and the water, the sun and the clouds, and the leaf of the plant and the ripe
grapes. I feel the fermentation of grapes, the alcoholic warmth, and the winegrower’s
work. I feel the style and the personality that emerged during the relationships that
occurred before my encounters with the others, prolonging the entanglement of lines
and thus, ultimately, living. This wine is never only this: it is I who encounter wine
within a ux where the things of the world ow. When one says: today I like this wine
more than the last time, it is not saying that “the wine” – that particular one – has
changed; it is rather saying that the entanglement, the encounter, has changed, and
that I also have changed with it. The enigma of the ongoing creation of life, of nature
always like the rst day, and of our resulting astonishment, lies in this little torsion of
meaning, in the di erence of this nuance.[29]
5. From judgment to exposition and labyrinth
Haptic perception has to do with memory but, as it is always a process in the making, it
opens up to creativity and imagination, calling for a di erent approach to rules and
precision. The sense of touch involves the question of precision, as observed by many
philosophers, such as Jacques Derrida and Jean-Luc Nancy, among others. What is
precision? When Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten invented aesthetics as a discipline, he
wanted to build a shelter for small perceptions, for non-measurable qualities, for the je
ne sais quoi, for passions and feelings. Aesthetics, according to Gottfried Leibniz, was
the science of sensitivity as clear and confused knowledge. The haptic approach takes
on board the challenge advanced by such confusion, its irreducibility to distinction and
analysis. Instead, optical perception, not only the one of logic and rational science but
also the one of aesthetics directed at objects, demands clarity and distinction. Thus,
aesthetics immediately su ers its in uence, betraying itself and thus becoming
inaccessible, as much because of reason as of imagination, when giving itself up to the
unattainable precision to which it aspires, distancing its gaze from the participated ow
within the processes. Wanting to achieve scienti c legitimacy as the knowledge of,
aesthetics ends up losing its speci c character of knowledge with: situated, singular,
and always engaged with the process it describes. Detachment is not possible.
Detached aesthetics is an illusion of perspective.[30] We do not need to set up sensehttps://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/
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oriented aesthetics against rational aesthetics, because life as a meshwork precedes
any hypostasis and classi cation, mind/body, reason/emotion, inside/outside, and so
on. Rather, the point seems to be the abandonment of the project of the modern and
monotheistic aesthetics of object, product, and evaluation criteria, in favor of a
pluralistic and polytheistic one. I stated at the beginning of the paper that
contemplation does not entail distance and detachment but asks for intimacy and
connivance, and it is indicated in Buddhist philosophy so well.[31] Haptic perception
attunes itself to the pragmatics of experience as such, and the absence of systems and
de nitive theories is not a lack, but a resource. The following thought from the Blue
Cli Record, a classic of Zen Buddhism, reverberates with correspondences with this
perspective:
When the
feelings of judgements of intellectual consciousness are ended, only then can
you see through. And when you see through, then as of old sky is sky, earth is
earth, mountains are mountains, rivers are rivers.[32]

Once we have become aware and skillful in attending to haptic experience, our need
for judgments stops in favor of savoring di erent experiences and encounters and
exposing ourselves to the unexpected and the miracle of every instant. In an inhabited
world, di erently than in an occupied space, we are nomadic perceivers without
boundaries or directions, based on attention rather than intention, on improvisations
rather than projected designs.
Ecological aesthetics is a continuous exercise of awareness about the correspondence
of all the living beings and an education about living inhabiting a world of lines. This
education supports and empowers care and attention, instead of choice and intention,
because the former cope with the situation and contexts, without guiding principles,
given rules and pre xed goals, as is the case for the latter. Care, awareness, and
compassion (from the Latin word compassio, “feeling together”) are strategically more
important than choice, culture, and competence (from the Latin cumpetere, hence
competition). Ecological aesthetics leads, then, to the ancient, noble (and neglected in
modern philosophy) concept of wisdom. Wisdom expresses not smartness but intuitive
intelligence; not necessarily culture but nurture; not analytical skills but savoir-faire;
not necessarily speci c competence but the ability to orient oneself along the
experience; not necessarily verbal skills but tacit expressivity.[33] Wisdom corresponds
to an art of caring and attention to the processes that we attend, feeling together with
them, participating and observing as we move along. If, on the one hand, smart
intelligence, culture, and cultivation came out of critical distance, intention-oriented
design, control, and judgment, on the other hand, wisdom corresponds to critical
intimacy, attention-oriented living, exposure, and savoring.
We come across feet, again, as a means of attuning and improving our haptic
perception. Pedestrian motion is e ective for a ground-based awareness of the
ongoing processes of experience, and, undoubtedly, nothing could be further from
naïve naturalism and the idea of experience as being authentic and self-evident. What
we need to do is to continue along a long path of attention and discipline at the end of
which lies a shift of perception. Walking o ers an alternative model of education that,
rather than instilling knowledge into the minds of novices, leads them out into the
world.[34]
Walking as thinking, as exercising thought by making— it does not mean instilling
knowledge, but educating to learn as a practice of exposure along the way. We can
propose another distinction between two di erent modes of moving, to make the
point clear: the maze and the labyrinth. While the maze presents a series of choices
related to the traveler’s intentions, in the labyrinth holding to the trails calls for an
ongoing attention.[35] Children often go through streets without any intentions or
xed positions; they just move by curiosity and, sometimes, wonder, and this is the
haptic approach to the world. Moving through the maze means inhabiting the
axiomatic paradigm of intentions and choices. I know where I want to go and,
gradually, I decide which path to take and where to turn, depending on predetermined
intentions. In the maze, intentions lead the way as the model in which design and
pre xed ideas command, according to an agency where doing and intentions
predetermines undergoing, exposition, and passions. In contrast, walking the labyrinth
means letting the attention simply carry us. In the labyrinth, doing and undergoing
reciprocally recall one another but the latter determines the former. The ow of the
current transports us, though we do move with margins of freedom. Life is not
subservient to action but action is subservient to life; action is without the prevalence
of the I-agency.[36]
Following the haptic approach, then, aesthetic education looks like a “poor pedagogy,”
to use an expression by Dutch philosopher Jan Masschelein, because it does not
address speci c goals or content and it amounts, instead, to an endless experience of
learning by experience. It is learning to learn; it is not about adopting acquired
instruction but carrying on an engaged life, composed with all the tasks emerging in
the practice of correspondence.
https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/
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From intention to attention, from instruction to education. Caring of the world,
conniving with its processes, is to cor-respond with it. Corresponding is to observe
from within in an intimately critical way. The haptic perception proposed by ecological
aesthetics reveals itself, then, also as an art of community and commonality in which
individual agency is always within a more comprehensive ow. Here lies the political
dimension of such ecological aesthetics. Once one accepts to practice perceptual
wisdom, the very idea of independence fades and the sovereignty of individual
freedom, pivotal in the logic of late capitalism, is put into question. When the logic of
choices and personal wishes often appears to be driven and induced by marketing, the
logic of care and of interdependence comes up as a concrete alternative that may open
a di erent political space that originates from the everyday ethical practice of
correspondence and relationship.
6. Conclusion: making soup as a way to wisdom
In recent years, I directed my research with an increasing resolve to reject any
possibility of philosophy as thinking of or thinking about or, that is, the mere
thematization of elds in order to comprehend by means of concepts. I try to propose
a philosophy where I do not teach something, but I teach how to learn and where I,
myself, learn to learn, again and again. For biographical and contingent reasons, I came
to explore this possibility through the substance of food. Nonetheless, it would be
wrong to understand this eld as a theme studied from a philosophical perspective
because they have rather been encounters to experience. In some of my recent works,
wine is a substance/medium with which I realize encounters: “I drink for reweaving or
creating a new fabric, for highlighting to myself the hidden connections between the
disentangled things of the world.”[37] I could say that this is the shift from a philosophy
of wine to a philosophy with wine or from being expert to being alive. Criticizing the
expertise does not mean to refuse it all and to praise ignorance; instead, it is a move to
dislocate the issue of aesthetic appreciation in a di erent eld, that is, the eld of
making- knowledge by experience. Expertise is oriented to the past (experitus);
experience (experiri) to the step forward.
Nowadays, more philosophers are addressing food issues, and from di erent
perspectives; too often, however, they treat it as an object to dissect and analyze. In my
view, instead, food or wine are interesting precisely because of their exemplarity in
terms of ecological perception: “Where is ‘outside’ in this case? Is it the landscape that
surrounds me where I stand? Is it the world outside my window? The walls of my room
and house? The clothes I wear? The air I breathe? The food I eat? Yet the food
metabolizes to become my body.”[38] Food are substances we take in on a daily basis,
permitting a practice of an ongoing exercise of presence in the world, to be realized as
a never-ending perceptual sharpening, that is rhythming unceasing correspondences.
A presence in the world: an objectless but processual world, full of knots of lines. Here
is an example of suggested attention and care stemming from a haptic attitude:
Next time you are making soup, pay attention to
the way your stirring gesture with the spoon both induces and responds to
viscosities and currents of the mixed ingredients in the pan. What is odd is
that studies of the material culture of kitchens have generally concentrated on
pots and pans, and spoons, to the virtual exclusion of the soup. The focus, in
short, has been on objects rather than materials. Yet on second thoughts, this
is not a division between what we nd in the kitchen: objects here; materials
there. It is rather a di erence of perspective. Householders might think of
pots and pans as objects, at least until they start to cook, but for the dealer
in scrap metal, they are lumps of material.[39]

Ecological aesthetics, as a constant exercise to sharpen the perceptual awareness to
the meshwork that corresponds to the world, thus joins Western philosophy with
Eastern thought. I shall end my paper with another reference that shows a
convergence with Taoism’s and Buddhism’s non-theorizing and non- systematizing
thought.
In a well-known text by Eihei Dōgen—a Japanese monk of the thirteenth century,
founder of the Sōtō school of Zen Buddhism dedicated to cooking and translated as
Instruction for the Cook, the culinary practice in a monastery represents a way of
achieving enlightenment. Every day, the cook (tenzo) chooses rice, vegetables, and
other ingredients, and he must protect and be frugal with them, as if they were his own
eyes.[40] The tenzo keeps a feeling/thinking that corresponds, in our terms, to the
intimate and careful attitude we have called haptic. Here, gestures are both means and
ends. An intimate care ourishes by considering every passage both as paramount to
the process of making and as valuable in itself. In Buddhism, there is no di erence
between ordinary and artistic gestures because art consists, primarily, in an ongoing
self- improvement from which the work realized results, even a simple dish with rice
and vegetables. In another passage, Dōgen speci es that the ordinary can undergo two
di erent attitudes: one of negligence and carelessness, the other of attention and
sensitivity. The latter redeems the value of the ordinary:

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/

8/11

10/5/2020

https://contempaesthetics.org/2019/11/08/article-879/
When you
prepare food, never view the ingredients from some commonly held perspective
nor think about them only with your emotions. Maintain an attitude that tries
to build great temples from ordinary greens, that expounds the buddhadharma
through the most trivial activity. […] When making a soup with ordinary greens,
do not be carried away by feelings of dislike toward them nor regard them
lightly; neither jump for joy simply because you have been given ingredients of
superior quality to make a special dish.[41]

I began this paper proposing the philosophical relevance of feet, and I followed the
idea according to which we are lines composing a meshwork. I believe that this
understanding is paramount for developing a feeling/thinking approach based on the
“knowledge with” paradigm, proposing then to call this approach haptic perception. I
think that the haptic approach is a consistent way to practice any kind of processual
and situated philosophy, that is, being aware that consciousness is not but rather
occurs, and that the mind is not individual but an extended ux, connected with the
world it makes.[42] This is the ecological mind, but an ecological mind means ecological
perception because mind is the ongoing mixture of feeling and thought. Thus,
ecological aesthetics, in my view, is the crossroad of such theoretical background, with
one additional feature, given the status of the discipline. Aesthetics performs its task as
a practice of nurture, convinced that in order to perceive wisely, theory never has the
last world. To understand, feel, think, appreciate, and enjoy, one has to live with the
world, not to dissect and analyze it.
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